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ABSTRACT:  This essay explores the Foucauldian influence on Cornel West’s prophetic prag-
matism.  Although West argues that Foucauldian methods are insufficient to deliver a philo-
sophy of liberation, I argue that there is nothing in Foucault that would prohibit West from 
such a goal, even though a philosophy of liberation was not one of Foucault’s goals.  For-
tunately, one can understand West’s own project of liberation in terms of ‚practices of 
freedom,‛ allowing one to describe West’s philosophical project in strict Foucauldian terms. 
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To take seriously ‚Afro-America‛ as a political reality in pro-
cess and a rhetorical figure in textual motion does not mean 
that we shun European critical discourses, especially those of 
the Frankfurters (Adorno, Marcuse) and French fries (Derrida, 
Foucault).1 
 
 
Prophetic pragmatism, Cornel West’s brand of pragmatism, is best described in the preface of 
Prophesy Deliverance! as ‚an Afro-American philosophy that is essentially a specific expression 
of contemporary American philosophy which takes seriously the Afro-American experience.‛2  
Taking the African-American experience seriously, however, does not require one to get rid of 
useful theories formulated by non-Black thinkers.  Philosophical culinary puns aside, West has 
always attempted to fuse African-American sensibilities and European forms; perhaps one 
could say that West tries to convert ‚Frankfurters and French fries‛ into ‚soul food.‛  This 
                                                 
1 Cornel West, Prophetic Fragments: Illuminations of the Crisis in American Religion and Culture (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1988), 170. 
2 Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity (Philadelphia: The Westmin-
ster Press, 1982), 11. 
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fusion of African-American life and European style might also justify Rosemary Cowan’s term 
‚jazz philosophy‛ to describe prophetic pragmatism.3 
But we must also make sure to scrutinize those theories.  Even though West is a 
pragmatist, he quickly tells us that ‚American philosophy has never taken the Afro-American 
experience seriously.  Even during the golden age of Royce, James, Santayana, and Dewey it 
remained relatively unaffected by the then rampant lynchings and widespread mistreatment 
of Afro-Americans.‛4  Therefore, West will not be opposed to using Eurocentric thinkers and 
theories as models, but they must be retrofitted to account for the plight of black people, a 
plight that is often ignored by the very thinkers and theories being employed.  West states this 
succinctly in an interview with bell hooks: 
 
To be intellectual, no matter what the color, means that one is going to be deeply influenced 
by other intellectuals of a variety of different colors.  When it comes to Black intellectuals, 
we have to, on the one hand, be very open to insights from wherever they come.  On the 
other hand, we must filter it in such a way that we never lose sight of what some of the si-
lences are in the work of White theorists, especially as those silences relate to issues of class, 
gender, race, and empire.  Why?  Because class, gender, race, and empire are fundamental 
categories which Black intellectuals must use in order to understand the predicament of 
Black people.5 
 
In other words, the prophetic pragmatist has to be able to modify the theoretical engines 
provided by mainstream academia so that they can account of race, class, and gender in a way 
that promotes West’s ultimate objective.  Dare I say, West’s ultimate objective is Black libera-
tion, followed by the liberation of all the oppressed people of the world.  Although West 
would not consider himself a theologian or philosopher of liberation, there is ample evidence 
that he is.6 
In this essay I seek to explicate and partially resolve the tension between West’s 
ultimate objective and the Foucauldian method he uses to strive for it.  It is clear that prophetic 
pragmatism can be conceived of as an extension of Foucauldian philosophy that fuses Fou-
cault’s methodology with liberation theology in order to create the theoretical underpinning 
for the vigilant resistance to white supremacy in all of its forms.  However, as West himself 
points out, Foucault’s methods can only go so far towards liberation.  Foucault’s own distrust 
of the notion of liberation, as well as his lack of interest in concrete polemics, creates great 
frustration for those who seek a plan of action.  I want to claim that it might be permissible for 
                                                 
3 Cf. Rosemary Cowan, Cornel West: The Politics of Redemption (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), Ch. 3. 
4 West, Prophesy Deliverance!, 11. 
5 bell hooks and Cornel West, Breaking Bread: Insurgent Black Intellectual Life (Toronto: Between the Lines, 
1991), 35. 
6 Cf. Cowan, 15: ‚no matter how much West insists that he is not a liberation theologian, it is impossible to 
fully understand his work without grounding it in a liberationist theological perspective.  What West labels 
as non-theological ‘prophetic Christianity’ is simply another name for his African-American liberation 
theology... *Liberation theology+ is the foundation for West’s entire body of work.‛  Although I originally re-
sisted Cowan’s claim at first (this claim constitutes the thesis of her book), I am beginning to find it more 
compelling. 
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those involved in actual cultural battles to use Foucault’s methodology en route to goals.  That 
said, I will nonetheless defend Foucault’s claim that polemics are problematic, and that proble-
maticization should lead to concrete practices of freedom instead of abstract notions of ‚libe-
ration.‛  Fortunately, West actually pursues concrete practices of freedom, so he is closer to 
Foucault than he might actually believe. 
This essay has four sections.  In the first section I will highlight what makes Foucault 
attractive to West’s project in comparison to standard Marxism.  Second, I will trace West’s 
critique of Foucault in light of West’s hope for black liberation.  I will then discuss Foucault’s 
critique of the notion of liberation and why he avoids polemics.  Finally, I will respond to 
West’s objections by showing how to better describe prophetic practices in Foucauldian terms. 
 
The Role of Foucauldian Method in Prophetic Pragmatism 
In his essay ‚Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism,‛ published in Prophetic Fragments, West for-
mulates the need to move past the traditional Marxist approaches to the question of race, 
namely, by reducing race to one more type of economic struggle.  Although economics is in-
deed a major part of the story of race in America, ‚Marxism is inadequate because it fails to 
probe other spheres of American society where racism plays an integral role—especially the 
psychological and cultural spheres.‛7  This failure is corrected, West argues, by ‚a micro-
institutional analysis‛ that would precede the traditionally Marxist ‚macrostructural‛ critique 
of government and capitalist systems.  West is not going to eliminate the macrostructural cri-
tique; rather, he will undergird it with two Foucauldian projects: (1) a ‚genealogical inquiry 
into the ideology of racism, focusing on the kinds of metaphors and concepts employed by 
dominant European (or white) supremacists in various epochs in the West and on ways in 
which resistance has occurred;‛ and (2) a ‚microinstitutional or localized analysis of the me-
chanisms that sustain white supremacist discourse in the everyday life of non-Europeans... 
and the ways in which resistance occurs.‛8 
Although West uses the word ‚genealogy‛ to name his analysis of racist ideology, I 
would prefer to use the term ‚archaeology‛ to describe the first dimension of West’s project 
stated above.  Insofar as it is a historical ontology of discourse and knowledge, the analysis of 
metaphors and concepts used in discourse is more properly a feature of archaeology.  Genea-
logy indeed characterizes the second dimension of the project, for genealogy explicates the 
apparatuses of power and maps out power relations.  Of course, one cannot do genealogy 
without archaeology, and archaeology requires genealogy to connect knowledge to power and 
subjectivity.  I simply point out here that West uses both archaeological and genealogical 
methods, both of which show strong Foucauldian influence. 
The first project is clearly an archaeological one, which West describes as an ‚inquiry 
into predominant European supremacist discourses.‛9  This project is most clearly visible in 
the second chapter of Prophesy Deliverance!, ‚A Genealogy of Modern Racism.‛  The second 
task is more of a (proper) genealogical project insofar as it will analyze ‚the ways in which 
                                                 
7 West, Prophetic Fragments, 99. 
8 Ibid., 101. 
9 Ibid., 102.  
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‘colored’ ‘Negro,’ and ‘black’ identities were created against a background of both fear and 
terror and a persistent history of resistance that gave rise to open rebellion in the 1960s.‛10  
This project is most clearly visible in Race Matters, especially his discussion of Black sexuality. 
In Prophesy Deliverance! West gives us an archaeological account of white supremacist 
ideology.  The Foucauldian archaeological undertones are very clear here; anyone looking to 
learn how to do an archaeology can learn a lot from West’s description: 
 
My aim in this chapter is to give a brief account of the way in which the idea of white 
supremacy was constituted as an object of modern discourse in the West, without simply 
appealing to the objective demands of the prevailing mode of production, the political in-
terests of the slaveholding class, or the psychological needs of the dominant white racial 
group.  Despite the indispensable role these factors would play in a full-blown explanatory 
model to account for the emergence and sustenance of modern racism in the West, I try to 
hold these factors constant and focus solely on a neglected variable in past explanatory 
models—namely, the way in which the very structure of modern discourse at its inception 
produced forms of rationality, scientificity, and objectivity as well as aesthetic and cultural 
ideals which require the constitution of the idea of white supremacy.11 
 
West accomplishes a lot in this one paragraph.  First, in the spirit of this section, West is going 
beyond the macrostructural reduction of white supremacy to economic production.  By mo-
ving past the people and conscious motives of modern racism, West explores what Foucault 
would call the ‚positive unconscious‛ of white supremacy that is not obtained by the history 
of ideas or the historiographical analysis of people’s views.  By bracketing these items, West 
will focus on simply the statements made, the enunciative functioning of those statements, the 
strategies created by those statements, and the concepts that govern those strategies.  In short, 
West will look at the level of discourse itself and show that what was said was only possible 
due to a given epistemic arrangement, not the motives of people, who are merely placeholders 
(lieu-tenants) in the discursive game.  Therefore the guiding question of West’s analysis is 
‚What are the discursive conditions for the possibility of the intelligibility and legitimacy of 
the idea of white supremacy in modern discourse?‛12  The answer to such a question will re-
quire archaeological analysis. 
We will not rehearse all the steps of West’s analysis here.  West shows how the modern 
period mixed modern classificatory science, Cartesian epistemology, and re-appropriated 
Classical aesthetics together in such a way that white supremacy became an ‚obvious‛ con-
cept.  This ‚obviousness‛ was not the result of any agent or group of people; the discourse 
itself ‚prohibited the intelligibility and legitimacy of the idea of black equality in beauty, 
culture, and intellectual capacity.  In fact, to ‚think‛ such an idea was to be deemed irrational, 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 103. 
11 West, Prophesy Deliverance!, 47 (emphasis his).  Unless West attended some of Foucault’s lectures at the 
Collège de France in the late 1970s, he worked on the genealogy of race without hearing or seeing Foucault’s 
own thoughts on racism.  The wording here could come from both Foucault’s The Order of Things and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge.  The use of Foucauldian method here is unique for its time. 
12 Ibid., 48. 
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barbaric, or mad.‛13  As presented here, white supremacy created ‚white people,‛ not the 
other way around.  This, of course, does not let white people off the hook in the fight for racial 
equality, but it does remove the guilt by association. 
At the end of the chapter, West raises a standard archaeological point: there is a mix-
ture of necessity and contingency in any archaeological analysis.  Once a discursive configura-
tion takes hold, its consequences are necessary.  However, the configuration itself is con-
tingent.  White supremacy is an ‚obvious‛ consequence of the mixture of modern classifica-
tory science, Cartesian theories of rationality, and ancient Greek and Roman themes of beauty, 
but the mixing of these elements did not have to happen.  Therefore, we have a necessity that is 
itself not necessarily so.  This contingent necessity is the historical a priori of all knowledge.  
West pits this historical a priori against the Marxist dialectic, freeing ‚the everyday life of black 
people‛ from being reduced simply to ‚the exploitative (oligopolistic) capitalist system of pro-
duction.‛14 
West’s discussion of black sexuality in Race Matters offers us a genealogically-
influenced analysis of how identities are formed out of a particular context which is itself a 
formation of relations of power and nondiscursive practices.  One sees in West’s description 
the influence of Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Vol. 1.  West writes that ‚many white Ameri-
cans still view black sexuality with disgust.  And some continue to view their own sexuality 
with disgust.  Victorian morality and racist perceptions die hard.‛15  Black sexuality creates a 
double-whammy of identity politics (the use of sexuality as a means of subjectification in addi-
tion to racial bio-politics), so a genealogy will need to explore both what I call a ‚sexuality of 
race‛ and a ‚racism of sex.‛ 
The sexuality of race pertains to the role of sex in the conception of race.  West alludes 
to this when he writes that  
 
the paradox of the sexual politics of race in America is that, behind closed doors, the dirty, 
disgusting, and funky sex associated with black people is often perceived to be more intri-
guing and interesting, while in public spaces talk about black sexuality is virtually taboo.  
Everyone knows it is virtually impossible to talk candidly about race without talking about sex.  Yet 
most social scientists who examine race relations do so with little or no reference to how 
sexual perceptions influence racial matters.16 
 
Of course, as Foucault noted in The History of Sexuality, discourse on sex is actually prolife-
rating, not being silenced.  Similarly, racism is bred by an incitement for discourse and a need 
to confess sexual desires and fears.  The relations of power at play in sexuality brings about 
race, making black people classifiable in either sexually aggressive or asexual terms (for exam-
ple, Aunt Jemima is asexual, but Bigger Thomas is a rapist). 
The racism of sex, a theme that is not as present in Foucault but genealogically possible, 
is the other direction of the race-sex power cycle.  Blacks have to respond to racism by means 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 65. 
15 Cornel West, Race Matters (New York: Vintage, 1993), 122. 
16 Ibid., 120. 
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of sexuality.  For some, that means the nihilistic embracing of stereotypical black sexuality as 
often glorified in pornography and music videos.  For others, this means the silencing and 
hatred of black sexuality identity.  This happens in two ways.  One way is for black people, 
especially black Christians, to find sexuality, especially their own sexuality, as sinful and dis-
gusting.  This disgust is usually white disgust under the guise of religiosity.  The problem with 
such disgust is that it divorces blacks from ‚a particular kind of power black people are 
perceived to have over whites,‛17 namely the lack of white control in black people’s sexual 
lives.  The other way is a strong homophobia that associates homosexuality with whiteness, 
which demonstrates ‚the refusal to entertain seriously new stylistic options for black men 
caught in the deadly endeavor of rejecting black machismo identities.‛18  Black women are fur-
ther impacted due to the way the racism of sex redoubles gender inequality. 
The way out of both the sexuality of race and the racism of sex for West is truly open 
dialogue: ‚As long as black sexuality remains a taboo subject, we cannot acknowledge, 
examine, or engage these tragic psychocultural facts of American life.‛19  To modify Foucault’s 
statement in the opening chapter of The History of Sexuality, perhaps someday black sex will be 
good again; perhaps even the day will come when being black will be good (Was it ever good 
before?). 
We therefore see that West uses archaeological and genealogical elements as part of 
what he calls in Keeping Faith ‚prophetic criticism.‛  Prophetic criticism ‚begins with social 
structural analyses‛ and ‚always keeps open a skeptical eye to avoid dogmatic traps, prema-
ture closures, formulaic formulations or rigid conclusions.‛20  Be it the ordering of discourse or 
the arrangement of power, part of prophetic pragmatism seeks to examine the microinstitu-
tional aspects of race and racism. 
 
West’s Critique of Foucault 
West’s overall criticism of Foucault is that archaeology and genealogy do not lay out paths for 
liberation.  This criticism presents itself in four ways in West’s writings: (1) Foucault’s anti- 
humanism complicates pragmatic romanticism, (2) Foucault’s conception of power is unable 
to move beyond subjectivization to a more active subjectivity, (3) Foucault’s lack of moral (or 
historical) telos makes his theory useless for true ‚kingdom building,‛ and (4) Foucault’s 
theory is more useful in the academy than in the non-academic world.  I will discuss each of 
these objections in turn. 
First, West is concerned about Foucault’s anti-romanticism, which is a natural con-
sequence from Foucault’s anti-humanism.  West alleges that Foucault ‚surreptitiously ascribes 
agency to discourses, disciplines, and techniques‛ while ‚downplaying human agency.‛21  
This anti-romanticism contradicts West’s Emersonian enthusiasm and Rortyan ironism.  It 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 126. 
18 Ibid., 129.  Of course, the writings of James Baldwin come to mind here, as well as the recent ‚crisis‛ in 
Black America concerning ‚the Down Low‛ in an age of ‚thug‛ culture.  A future essay of mine addresses 
the Down Low phenomenon in terms of the racism of sex. 
19 Ibid., 130-131. 
20 Cornel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America (New York: Routledge, 1993), 23. 
21 Cornel West, The Cornel West Reader (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999), 163. 
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contradicts the Emersonian belief that we can achieve our goals through work and determi-
nation (hence why West describes pragmatism as an ‚evasion‛ of philosophy, insofar as Emer-
son set the tone of nature and labor as the American standard).  It contradicts the Rortyan 
hope that all things can be redescribed by us (Rorty would remind us that ‚the world does not 
speak; only we do.‛22)  West asserts instead that ‚human agency remains central—all we have 
in human societies and histories are structured and unstructured human social practices over 
time and space.‛23  Insofar as Foucault will not put his trust in ‚man‛ to resolve problems, 
Foucault rubs against what West considers one of the central pillars of pragmatism: individual 
and collective human agency. 
Second, West claims that Foucault limits the discussion of power to the realm of sub-
jectivization.  He writes that Foucault ‚remains preoccupied by one particular kind of opera-
tion of power, namely, the various modes by which human beings are constituted into sub-
jects.‛24  This preoccupation, West claims, is due to Foucault’s Kantian adherence to the trans-
cendental project, the question concerning the conditions of the possibility of subjectivity.  
Indeed, Foucault’s answer is a new answer; unfortunately, the question is one that West does 
not believe is worth answering.  At the end of the day, Foucault is thinking of the post-Nietz-
schean, immanent possibilities of the transcendental project.  By describing power in terms of 
discipline, biopolitics, and governmentality, Foucault’s analysis of power is always for our 
sake.  But who is this ‚us‛ for whom Foucault’s analysis of power is done?  Not the agent of 
change understood in an Emersonian fashion.  West detects a tension between Foucault’s anti-
humanism and his overemphasis on human subjectivity in discussions of power relations.  If 
the true ‚agents‛ of things are discursive and nondiscursive practices, shouldn’t the analysis 
of power deal primarily with the practices themselves instead of the subjectivity such practices 
bring about? 
The third objection is that Foucault’s ‚fervent anti-utopianism—again in reaction to 
Hegel and Marxist teleological utopianism—rejects all forms of ends and aims for political 
struggle.‛25  Since West’s goals involve changes in the actual quality of life of actual black 
people, Foucault fails to ‚keep his eyes on the prize.‛  Foucault’s response to the so-called 
oppression felt by so many is to deny it by incorporating resistance into the power game of the 
oppressor.  In short, Foucault does not claim a moral mandate; he does not do analyses in or-
der to show one side or the other as the side with which God or history would side.  There is 
no way out of Foucault’s theory to move on to liberating progressive practices.  Nothing is get-
ting better or worse in Foucault’s analyses; there is simply epistemic shifts and redistributions 
of power relations.  West’s theological underpinnings demand that there is something called 
‚the Kingdom of God‛ that we are getting closer to or father from bringing about on earth ‚as 
it is in Heaven.‛ 
Finally, West sees Foucault as a perfect model for a particular kind of struggle, one that 
is necessary but unfortunately limited to the academy.  West refers to this in many different 
                                                 
22 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1989), 6. 
23 West, The Cornel West Reader, 163. 
24 Ibid., 162. 
25 Ibid., 163-164. 
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places, but I will focus on its descriptions in Keeping Faith.  In the essay ‚The Dilemma of the 
Black Intellectual,‛ West describes the Foucauldian black intellectual as one who questions the 
will to truth: 
 
the postmodern situation requires ‚the specific intellectual‛ who shuns the labels of scien-
tificity, civility and prophecy and instead delves into the specificity of the political, economic 
and cultural matrices within which regimes of truth are produced, distributed, circulated 
and consumed.  No longer should intellectuals deceive themselves by believing... that they 
are struggling ‚on behalf‛ of the truth; rather the problem is the struggle over the very sta-
tus of the truth and the vast institutional mechanisms which account for this status.26 
 
What this means is that the Foucauldian correctly realizes that ‚the truth‛ itself is what every-
one is fighting about.  The sphere of ‚the true‛ is not fixed but is itself the battlefield upon 
which intellectual battles are waged.  The bad news for this model of black intellectual life is 
that it ‚encapsulates black intellectual activity within the comfortable bourgeois academy of 
postmodern America.‛27  For West, the work to be done is happening out there: on the streets, 
in the churches, and at the town halls.  West describes the goal for black intellectual life as ‚the 
creation or reactivation of institutional networks that promote high-quality critical habits pri-
marily for the purpose of black insurgency... to stimulate, hasten and enable alternative per-
ceptions and practices by dislodging prevailing discourses and powers.‛28  The Foucauldian 
model works if the thinker were to plug herself into the public battles outside of the academy.  
Insofar as West thinks that that does not happen, this lack of engagement serves as a criticism.  
In the essay ‚Theory, Pragmatisms, and Politics,‛ West states that although the academy is an 
important site for resistance, ‚oppositional professional intellectuals‛ (West’s term for those in 
the academy) often fail ‚to break out of the local academic context and make links with non-
academic groups and organizations.‛29 
A second example in Keeping Faith is his discussion of critical legal studies, which exa-
mines the will to truth in legal research.  West compliments the field for showing how certain 
notions in legal studies need to be re-examined, a move which follows from West’s favorite 
aspects of Foucauldian method.  However, West claims impatiently, ‚*f+or too long critical le-
gal theorists have put forward primarily academic critiques of the academy—critiques that 
further extend the authority of the academy while they attempt to delegitimate the academy... 
they remain highly limited without elaboration of their implications in the public sphere of 
intellectual exchange.‛30  Like West’s comments about Foucauldian postmodern academics, 
those who challenge the will to truth in law schools often do so within the confines of the 
academy.  They hope that training people to think critically about the law in new ways that 
are mindful of oppressive practices and cultural bias will result in a changed world, but it is at 
most only a hopeful action, not concrete praxis. 
                                                 
26 West, Keeping Faith, 81. 
27 Ibid., 82. 
28 Ibid., 83. 
29 Ibid., 100. 
30 Ibid., 204. 
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Keeping West’s ultimate objective in mind, it is easy to observe West’s main tension 
with Foucault and Foucauldians.  West wants a theory that will help lead particular people 
(African-Americans) to perform particular actions (vote for Barack Obama) in order to gain 
particular goals (black liberation).  Foucault is skeptical of these kinds of theory.  From a Wes-
tian point of view, Foucault is aloof concerning the true power of his own theory.  It seems 
that there should be nothing stopping Foucault from offering solutions to problems.  Perhaps 
what West finds unnerving about Foucault is that Foucault will take up an actual problem that 
actually affects society, analyze it in great detail, and then walk away, theoretically satisfied.  
For West, satisfaction should only come when the problem is solved, not when it is theo-
retically ‚understood.‛  After all, as Dewey reminds us, a problem correctly posed is a pro-
blem half-solved.  Since Foucault’s method of problematization works so well when it comes 
to posing the real problems, why walk away from solving them? 
It is important to note that Dewey’s view of pragmatism as the study of the intel-
ligibility of practices is playing a role here.  For West, theory should ‚prove‛ the practices of 
resistance against white supremacy that everyday black people are performing.  Foucault, 
West would allege, downplays resistance, which in turn might suggest that those practices are 
not theoretically significant.  Insofar as West seeks to theoretically support such practices, Fou-
cault is a powerful yet insufficient resource for prophetic pragmatism.  West sees himself as 
taking the Foucauldian method to its fullest potential by coupling it to the quotidian battles for 
decency and dignity: in short, the plight of people of African descent in the United States.  We 
might say that prophetic pragmatism is an extension of Foucauldian philosophy that fuses 
Foucault’s methodology with liberation theology in order to create the theoretical under-
pinning for the vigilant resistance to white supremacy in all of its forms.  The goal is to tell 
those who are fighting for freedom that the fight is itself justified and, from the liberation theo-
logical perspective, sanctioned by God’s will. 
 
Foucault and Practices of Freedom 
In the spirit of fairness, Foucault is not suggesting that one cannot strive to be agents for 
change or be politically active: his own life would contradict such a claim.  However, Fou-
cault’s concerns about polemics, repression, and liberation are worth taking seriously.  
Foucault is making a very subtle distinction, one that I worry is missed by many who read 
Foucault’s work, including West (but West is definitely not alone in this regard).  In this sec-
tion, we will look at Foucault’s take on polemics, repression/oppression, and liberation.   
In his interview with Paul Rabinow, ‚Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,‛ Fou-
cault worries that our current state of political discourse ‚defines alliances, recruits partisans, 
unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an up-
holder of opposed interests against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is 
defeated and either surrenders or disappears.‛31  One finds polemics on all sides of the issue, 
which leads to political gridlock or the prevalent multiple split-screen discussions on news 
networks with everyone fighting for their position but no one communicating.  This model of 
                                                 
31 Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabi-
now (New York: New Press, 1994), 112. 
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discourse limits the possibilities for new ideas and new ways of thinking.  Foucault wants to 
avoid polemics, because political interests contaminate the pursuit of knowledge.  He tells Ra-
binow that he ‚never tried to analyze anything whatsoever from the point of view of politics, 
but always to ask politics what it had to say about the problems with which it was con-
fronted.‛32  In other words, Foucauldian analysis is not done ‚in order to reject all possible so-
lutions except for the one valid one.‛33  Foucault is not interested in ‚proving‛ any particular 
point of view to be the correct one.  Once his analysis is done, anyone may take his findings 
and make better-informed moves.  But no particular group ‚gains more ammunition‛ from 
Foucault’s writings.  So Foucault is not against the political use of his work if all involved 
understand that he is not endorsing any given position.  He is interested in problematization, 
the analysis of the elements that form a given situation.  From that situation, a whole myriad 
of solutions can be proffered. 
Foucault ends the interview with a great definition of archaeology as the history of 
systems of thought that bolsters his claim that his task was not to pick sides but to show the 
conditions of the possibility of the sides themselves: 
 
To one single set of difficulties, several responses can be made.  And most of the time 
different responses actually are proposed.  But what must be understood is what makes 
them simultaneously possible: it is the point in which their simultaneity is rooted; it is the 
soil that can nourish them all in their diversity and sometimes in spite of their con-
tradictions... the work of a history of thought would be to rediscover at the root of these 
diverse solutions the general form of problematization that has made them possible—even 
in their very opposition.34 
 
Perhaps those who critique Foucault for not being sufficiently political are simply wishing that 
Foucault took sides (preferably their side) within his problematizations.  Foucault is not as 
quick to discredit ‚oppositional‛ positions since the actual positions are less interesting than 
the battlefield on which the battle is taking place.  This is why the distinction between ‚true‛ 
and ‚false‛ are uninteresting for Foucault; the more interesting question is what is the ‚truth‛ 
that undergirds all classification of propositions into true ones or false ones.  There are many 
possible solutions to any problematization, and it is not Foucault’s task to rank them.  Others 
can rank them; in doing so, they simply show which side of the battle they are on.  West 
would rank solutions based on how effective they were for bringing about black liberation 
since that is what he is trying to do. 
Foucault’s method of problematization is indeed a hard sell to those who feel the forces 
of power directly affect their lives in the form of oppression and humiliation.  Foucault’s an-
swer is an unsatisfactory one to those who have defined themselves in terms of struggle.  As 
Mark David Woods writes, ‚*t+he victims of racism, sexism, and exploitation would not get 
very far in their struggle to rid the world of these social ills on the basis of Foucault’s concept 
of power... Foucault’s theory of power loses its capacity to explain who uses power against 
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whom and for what.‛35  There are people in the world who consider themselves ‚oppressed.‛  
Would Foucault not suggest that they fight for liberation? 
Foucault is very clear that he is not against overcoming oppression.  In the interview 
‚The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,‛ Foucault defines philosophy as 
‚that which calls into question domination at every level and in every form in which it exists, 
whether political, economic, sexual, institutional, or what have you.‛36  Foucault reminds us 
that the problem lies in the fact that we want to equate power with domination, an equivo-
cation that should not be applied to his analysis.  When Foucault claims that power is every-
where, he is not saying that everyone is in a state of domination.  He states that ‚*t+he idea that 
power is a system of domination that controls everything and leaves no room for freedom 
cannot be attributed to me.‛37  Foucault is indeed a post-Nietzschean Kantian: freedom is eve-
rything.  One could even say that freedom, not power, is Foucault’s main interest. 
In light of this, Foucault differentiates between practices of freedom and processes of 
liberation.  Practices of freedom are often called ‚practices of the self‛ in Foucault’s work.  
These are the practices undertaken by individuals and groups to form themselves into per-
sons.  These persons are not identical to the Cartesian and phenomenological notions of sub-
jectivity; they are works of art that one makes out of one’s self.  The later works and lectures of 
Foucault focus on these practices.  A state of domination occurs when practices of freedom ‚do 
not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited.‛38  In those cases, 
liberation is needed, and Foucault is completely in favor of liberation against domination. 
That noted, Foucault wants us to only use the language of liberation in the context of 
domination.  Most of what is called ‚liberation‛ actually isn’t; it is more properly classified as 
‚resistance.‛  But resistance is a sign of freedom and power, not domination.  When Foucault 
says that resistance is part of the power relation, he is therefore not absorbing oppression into 
domination, but rather proving the freedom possible in resistance.  Foucault clarifies this point 
in the interview: 
 
[I]n order for power relations to come into play, there must be at least a certain degree of 
freedom on both sides... in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of resistance 
because if there were no possibility of resistance... there would be no power relations at all.  
This being the general form, I refuse to reply to the question I am sometimes asked: ‚But if 
power is everywhere, there is no freedom.‛  I answer that if there are relations of power in 
every social field, this is because there is freedom everywhere.39 
 
Foucault’s point is that resistance is itself a practice of freedom.  The ability to resist ‚oppres-
sive‛ powers is the proof that one is not totally oppressed.  A true state of domination does not 
allow for any resistance or practice of freedom.  Thus, Foucault is not suggesting that libera-
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tion is not needed or that it is impossible; he is simply making a careful distinction between 
oppression and domination. 
A Foucauldian must be skeptical of claims of oppression if it seems clear that what 
those who claim to be oppressed mean is that there are obstacles in the way of their will to 
power.  That is the case for everyone; power cannot operate without resistance.  Therefore 
everyone has a law, another person, or historical circumstances that get in the way of their will 
to power.  That is not oppression.  Some people have had ‚larger‛ historical obstacles in their 
way than others; some have even experienced states of domination.  But Foucault is quite clear 
that liberation from states of domination is insufficient; practices of freedom are then neces-
sary: ‚this practice of liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom that 
will still be needed if this people, this society, and these individuals are to be able to define 
admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society.‛40  Since everyone needs 
practices of freedom, Foucault puts more emphasis on them than on processes of liberation, 
which are the conditions for the possibility of one exercising practices of freedom. 
Therefore it would be a mistake to claim that Foucault is blind to oppression and a 
fortiori to liberation.  What Foucault is more interested in is resistance, and the creative prac-
tices of freedom that provide such resistance.  One could say that Foucault empowers resistance; 
he assures us that resistance is a natural part of power relations and that power relations are 
key in the formation of selves as persons.  Foucault believes that one must work at becoming a 
person; therefore, practices of freedom are more appealing than processes of (mere) liberation. 
 
I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because if it is not 
treated with precautions and within certain limits, one runs the risk of falling back on the 
idea that there exists a human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, 
economic, and social processes, has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by 
mechanisms of repression.  According to this hypothesis, all that is required is to break these 
repressive deadlocks and man will be reconciled with himself, rediscover his nature or 
regain contact with his origin, and reestablish a full and positive relationship with himself.  I 
think this idea should not be accepted without scrutiny.41 
 
Once liberated—once one is capable of performing practices of freedom—one is to create 
oneself.  Most advocates of ‚liberation‛ believe that one must overcome oppression and then 
everything will be fine.  Foucault indeed wants people to be free from oppression, but the real 
task remains thereafter.  Liberation cannot be an end in itself.  Tying this into the discussion on 
polemics, one is not finished once one’s opponent is defeated in a political race or an argument 
is won in a debate.  Such a goal is wrong-headed, for it excludes not only the truth about dis-
cursive formations and power relations but also the task for everyone to take care of 
themselves and form themselves into persons. 
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A Foucauldian Response to West 
West is so committed to liberation theology (whether he wants to acknowledge it or not) that 
he underplays practices of freedom.  Or does he?  One of the things I like most in West is his 
account of black prophetic practices: preaching, powerful praying, dancing, and music.  Afri-
can-Americans had to create themselves virtually out of nothing.  In slavery, blacks were in a 
state of domination, yet there was just enough freedom for slaves to create songs about 
emancipation and final retribution on the day of judgment.  Blacks created a whole cuisine out 
of scraps and their own dialect of the English language. 
After emancipation, yet still limited in freedom due to Jim Crow, African-Americans 
developed even more practices of freedom that served as resistance to white supremacy.  Jazz, 
blues, and soul music are West’s favorite examples.  West praises black music precisely insofar 
as it provides ‚freedom from unfreedom.‛42  The black ability to convert misery into joy 
through music is nothing short of freedom.  This ‚jazz freedom,‛ West tells us, is ‚open to the 
whole world if they’re willing to want to learn how to be free—really free—in their hearts and 
minds and souls.  Nothing like it in the world.‛43  Black music also serves a critical function for 
West.  Not only does black music inject African-American sensibilities into European musical 
forms, it also injects itself into discourse proper, allowing African-American sensibilities crack 
into Eurocentric understandings of our bodies and aesthetic possibilities.  West claims that 
black music inserted a ‚blue note‛ into American culture: 
 
the blue note that black people injected into human history: a note of defiance that calls into 
question the unjustified suffering, a note of dissonance that shatters the superficial harmony, 
a note of dignity that allows us [African-Americans] to dig deep into the depths of our souls 
and call into question the attacks on our beauty, our intelligence, our moral capacity.44 
 
Even hip-hop music, the most recent formulation of this blue note, serves as a practice of free-
dom and resistance.  Hip-hop critiques the police state found in inner-city ghettos and housing 
projects.  Although West worries that hip-hop’s materialist representations of success and 
often-misogynist lyrics lead to black nihilism, it is nonetheless part of what he calls ‚the 
struggle for freedom,‛ or what we would call practices of freedom. 
In Democracy Matters, West uses black culture as a model for resistance against the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11.  He discusses the 1955 murder of Emmett Till by white supremacists 
(who West calls ‚American terrorists‛) and how his mother held an open-casket funeral with 
Emmett’s mangled body for everyone to see.  At the funeral, Till’s mother says ‚I don’t have a 
minute to hate.  I’ll pursue justice for the rest of my life.‛45  West believes that this would have 
been a better response than the one given by the Bush administration: 
 
Since 9/11 we have experienced the niggerization of America, and as we struggle against the 
imperialistic arrogance of the us-versus-them, revenge-driven policies of the Bush admini-
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stration, we as a blues nation must learn from a blues people how to keep alive our deep 
democratic energies in dark times rather than resort to the tempting and easier response of 
militarism and authoritarianism.46 
 
Of course West is being polemical here, but his point is otherwise exact: Americans can adopt 
African-American responses to the violence that had been done to them.  African-Americans 
have already worked out the peaceful practices of freedom that provide resistance to terrorist 
uses of power. 
It turns out that African Americans have created quite a few practices of freedom, con-
stantly defying the alleged ‚domination‛ of white supremacy.  I believe that a closer dialogue 
between West and Foucault becomes possible once those practices take center stage, instead of 
focusing solely on the forces of power that create oppressive states of affairs.  This is where 
Foucault’s turn to ethics becomes useful.  A future analysis would connect African American 
cultural practices to the technologies of the self practiced by the Stoics and Cynics.  West’s 
accounts of revolutionary Christianity and subversive hope are the most likely points of 
comparison.  Since West does not move from genealogy to ethics, he cannot get past the po-
lemical view of power and turn to Foucault’s account of freedom, a freedom that African 
Americans have mastered over the centuries, even in spite of oppression and perhaps because 
of it. 
In conclusion, if West’s only objection to Foucault is that Foucault does not leave 
sufficient room for liberation, a Foucauldian can simply respond by pointing out that Foucault 
indeed leaves room for liberation and, additionally, West’s ‚libratory‛ prophetic practices are 
better classified as practices of freedom.  If one is willing to drop the oppression-liberation mo-
del of thought, then West and Foucault become closer to each other as mutually strong post-
Marxist possibilities.47 
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